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HABEAS CORPUS-STATE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
-EFFECT OF STATE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT ON AVAILABILITY
OF FEDERAL

433

U.S.

HABEAS CORPUS

REVIEw-Wainwright v. Sykes,

72 (1977).

Respondent Sykes was convicted of third degree murder after
a jury trial in a Florida state court. Mter his arrest he had been
given his Miranda warnings, but he waived his right to remain
silent and made a confession which was introduced at his trial. 1 His
attorney did not challenge the admission of the confession nor did
the judge question its admissibility. Sykes was unsuccessful in his
direct appeals in the Florida state courts. Only later, in a collateral
attack in a state habeas corpus proceeding, did he raise the issue of
the voluntariness of his confession. The state collateral attack was
unsuccessful because under Florida's contemporaneous objection
rule the procedural default barred relief. 2 Sykes was successful,
however, in having his federal habeas corpus petition entertain~d
in the United States District Court in Florida. The State of Florida
appealed the federal district court's decision to entertain the peti
tion. Although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal
defendant's failure to comply with a valid state procedural rule
concerning the admission of a confession would bar federal habeas
corpus review of his claim unless there is· a showing of cause for
!. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.S. 72, 74 (1977). No written statement was of
fered into evidence because Sykes refused to sign the statement once it was typed.
ld. at 74 n.!.
2. FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.190(i) (West 1967) provides:
Motions to Suppress a Confession or Admissions Illegally Obtained.
(1) Grounds. Upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, the
Court shall suppress any confession or admission obtained illegall~ from
the defendant.
(2) Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall be made prior to trial
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware
of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may enter
tain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial.
(3) Hearing. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact
necessary to be decided in order to rule on the motion.
Sykes' first argument was that this was not a contemporaneous objection rule and
that it put the burden on the trial judge to raise on his own motion the question of
the admissibility of any inculpatory statement. This interpretation was rejected by
the Court because of the language of the statute and because of Florida case law
interpreting the rule. 433 U.S. at 85-86.
167
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the noncompliance and a showing of prejudice resulting from the
procedural default. 3

1.

BACKGROUND

The federal habeas corpus statute concerning state prisoners
provides that federal courts shall entertain an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."4 This statutory version of the common law writ of habeas
corpus has given rise to four different questions which have often
confronted the Supreme Court. 5 The first three questions concern,
respectively, the type of federal claim that can be heard by a fed
eral habeas court,6 the degree of deference to which a state court's
3. Id. at 86-87.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970). The earlier version of this statute was in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and was applicable only to prisoners detained by federal au
thority. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1970». Its scope was greatly expanded in 1867, when Congress au
thorized federal courts in all cases, including state cases, to grant the writ where a
person was being held in violation of the Constitution of the United States. C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 238 (3d ed. 1976).
5. Three of these questions were not at issue in the Sykes case but they are
relevant because they illustrate the Court's willingness to modify its views about the
scope of habeas corpus even when the statutory language has remained unchanged.
See 433 U.S. at 80-81 and notes 6-8 infra.
6. Until the early twentieth century, the Court confined argument to the issue
of whether the state court had the required jurisdiction to detain the prisoner. This
jurisdictional viewpoint gradually changed. C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 239. In
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), the Court held that if a court was under sway
of mob rule, the proceedings, although formally proper, would be a mere mask de
priving the court of jurisdiction. A prisoner convicted in such circumstances could
then attack his conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition. In Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938), an indigent federal prisoner's claim that he was denied the right
to counsel at his trial was held to challenge the "power and authority" of the trial
court. His claim, therefore, could be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding. [d. at
463. In 1942, the Court finally abandoned its jurisdictional analysis stating:
[Tlhe use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity
of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment
of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It
extends also to those exceptional cases where the coiwiction has been in
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is
the only effective means of preserving his rights.
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (citations omitted). The writ had
evolved over several decades from a mere checklist of jurisdictional requirements to
a proceeding available whenever the state proceeding alIegedly violated a prisoner's
federal constitutional rights. "Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamen
tal of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial
inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a person." Carafas v. LaVallee,
391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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resolution of the federal claim is entitled,7 and the extent to which
a defendant must exhaust state remedies before resorting to federal
habeas corpus. 8 In Sykes, the Court considered the fourth ques
tion: what constitutes an independent and adequate state ground
for a conviction that will bar otherwise cognizable federal issues
from review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine originally
developed as a jurisdictional limitation on direct Supreme Court
review of state court decisions. 9 When a case is resolved on state
substantive or procedural grounds so that the federal question is
not reached,10 or when the federal question is decided along with a
7. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the Supreme Court held that a fed
eral judge is not barred by res judicata from deciding the federal question involved
in a claim that had been rejected by a state court. ld. at 458. Justice Frankfurter, in a
concurring opinion, stated that the federal judge could accept the determination of
the facts by the state court unless there had been a "vital flaw" in the state factfind
ing process. ld. at 506. He reasoned that the prior factfinding hearing would be more
accurate than a new hearing because the recollections of those witnesses still availa
ble would be affected by the passage of time. In 1963, in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963), the Court held that the federal court had the power to receive evidence
and try facts anew on a habeas corpus petition. The majority summarized six cir
cumstances in which a federal evidentiary hearing was mandatory:
.
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation
of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact
hearing.
ld. at 313. The six circumstances were codified in somewhat different form in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) (added by Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105).
8. In Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the petitioner claimed that his in
dictment was based on an unconstitutional statute and sought habeas corpus relief in
advance of the trial. The Court held that the federal courts had the power to decide
the issue, but that the importance of maintaining good relations among the state
courts and the federal court system weighed against taking up the matter until it had
been considered in the state trial. ld. at 251. See also Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114
(1944); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179
(1907). The requirement of exhaustion of state remedies is codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) & (c) (1970), which states that an application for a writ will not be granted
if the prisoner has a state-provided right to raise the issue by any available proce
dure. An application for direct review to the Supreme Court was initially required as
well, Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), but this requirement was overruled by the
Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963).
9. The origin of the doctrine is found in the statutory construction of 2!,\ U.S.c.
§ 1257 (1970), defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases
decided in state courts. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1315, 1340 (1961).
10. In one case, for example, a contract was held by a state court to have an
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nonfederal claim which is sufficient to support the judgment inde
pendently, there is no appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
of the United States. l l A decision on the federal question by the
Supreme Court would not affect the outcome of the case and would
constitute an advisory opinion.12 A decision on the nonfederal
question would unduly infringe on the principles of federalism. 13
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine eventu
ally reached the habeas corpus area. 14 In that context, however,
reliance on the doctrine by. the Supreme Court depended on
whether the state law grounds were substantive or procedural.
When the state law grounds for a conviction were substantive and
were the only issues raised or were dispositive of the case, it was
accepted. that no federal habeas corpus review would be avail
able. 15 The law has been unclear, however, when federal claims
could have been dispositive of the case in state court but were not
heard because they were not presented in accordance with state
procedural rules. Whether such a procedural default was an inde~
pendent and adequate state law ground to bar federal habeas. cor
pus review is the subject of the Sykes case, which represents the
Court's most recent attempt to deal with this difficult issue.
Earlier decisions demonstrate the Supreme Court's varied ap
proach to the treatment of st~te court procedural defaults. In 1953,
in Daniels v. Alien,16 the defendant's lawyer filed an appeal with
the state supreme court one day after the filing deadline. The state
appellate court refused to hear the case. The Supreme Court held
invalid arbitration clause which was not severable from the contract, so that the
whole contract was invalid. The determination of non-severability made it unneces
sary for the state court to decide whether the contract violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The determination of the nonfederal question resolved the case. The Supreme
Court would thus have no jurisdiction to review the federal question involved in
such a decision. Fox Film Corp, v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 211 (1935).
11. There are times when both state and federal questions are decided but it is
unclear on which ground the state court has rested its decision. In such cases, the
decision will not be reviewable if the state ground is an independent and adequate
ground for the decision. Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1872). If the
state ground does not have fair and substantial factual support, then the Supreme
Court will exercise jurisdiction and review the case. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 455 (1958).
.
12. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-30 (1963). See also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 126 (1945).
13. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1875).
14. See Irvin v. DQwd, 359 U.S. 394, 407 c18 (1959) (dissenting opinions).
15. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); Durky v. Mayo, 351 U.S.
277 (1956); Meeks v. Lainson, 236 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1956).
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (decided sub 110m. Brown v. Allen).
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that federal habeas relief was not available to the defendant. The
Court reasoned that failure to perfect. an appeal according to
reasonable state procedural rules· would bar collateral attack
through federal habeas corpus because the state decision rested on
independent and adequate state law grounds. 17
In 1963, however, in a sweeping opinion by Justice Brennan,
the Court overruled Daniels in Fay v. Noia. 18 In, Noia, the defen
dant had personally decided not to directly appeal his conviction 'of
murder fearing that if he were successful in his appeal a second
trial could result in the death penalty. His two codefendants ap
pealed and lost. Fourteen years later, the codefendants were re
leased on federal habeas corpus writs because of a finding that their
confessions had been coerced. Noia then sought federal habeas
corpus relief. The state argued that Noia's petition should not be
entertained because of his earlier failure to directly appeal his con
viction and thus exhaust his state remedies at that time. 19 The
Court disagreed, stating that while a procedural default such as the
failure to make a timely appeal constituted an independent and
adequate state law ground that would bar direct review by the
Supreme Court, such a procedural default would not bar federal
habeas corpus review. 20
Under Noia, a procedural default in state court would not bar
a federal court from providing habeas corpus relief unless there had
been a deliberate by-pass of state procedural rules. A federal dis
trict judge would be required to entertain a habeas corpus petition,
but there would be a "limited discretion" in the federal judge to
'''deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the or
derly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his
state court remedies. "21
The determination of whether there had been a deliberate
by-pass of state procedural rules under Noia was governed by the
traditional waiver test set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst. 22 The Zerbst
Court defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or aban

17. Id. at 458.
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
19. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
20. "[T]he doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute
an adequate and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review
is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal
habeas statute." 372 U.S. at 399.
21. Id. at 438.
22. 304 U5. 458 (1938).
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donment of a known right or privilege. "23 The N oia Court used
this personal waiver standard in determining that the defendant's
decision not to appeal was not such an intentional relinquishment
as to amount to a "deliberate by-pass."24 The Court in Noia noted
that the defendant had a "grisly choice" between his life sentence
or pursuit of an appeal which could have resulted in the death
penalty at a second trial and ruled that there had been no deliber
ate by-pass of the state system in order to have the claim heard for
the first time on the federal leveL 25

II.

THE SYKES CASE

In Sykes, the Court rejected the deliberate by-pass standard
established in Noia and replaced it with a cause and prejudice
standard. This standard was meant to be narrower than the Noia
standard, thus decreasing the availability of federal habeas corpus
relief.26 A default caused by a deliberate by-pass of state proce
dures and a default caused by an inadvertent attorney failure to
abide by state procedures must both meet the cause and prejudice
standard of Sykes before federal habeas corpus review will be
granted.
In Sykes, the Court first determined that the attorney's pro
cedural default in not challenging the use of the confession at trial
forfeited the right to a hearing on this issue at the trial level. 27
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, then examined whether
the procedural default would constitute an independent and ade

23. [d. at 464. In the Zerbst case, this standard was to be applied on remand by
the district court to determine whether the accused had competently and intelli
gently waived his right to counsel.
24. 372 U.S. at 399.
25. [d. at 440.
26. "We leave open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of
the 'cause' and 'prejudice' standard, and note here only that it is narrower than the
standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, ...." 433 U.S. at 87.
27. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Court invalidated a New York
procedure which, rather than providing a hearing on the voluntariness of a confes
sion, allowed the jury to decide the issue. Justice Rehnquist, in Sykes, stated that
Jackson was not to be read as requiring a hearing when the defendant has not ob
jected to the admission of his confession. 433 U.S. at 86. Rather, it was to be read as
requiring a hearing on the issue only when the confession has been challenged. The
Court reasoned that a defendant has a " 'right at some stage in the proceedings to
object to the use of the conf.ession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determi
nation on the issue of voluntariness... .' " [d. (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at
376-77) (emphasis added by the Court). As Sykes' attorney had not challenged the use
of the confession, a hearing on its voluntariness was not constitutionally required. 433
U.S. at 86.
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quate state law ground that would bar federal habeas corpus review.
He noted that under Fay v. Noia, such a procedural default would
not bar federal habeas corpus relief unless it was shown that the
default was a deliberate by-pass of the state procedural system. 28
However, he then cited two later decisions involving challenges to
grand jury selection, Davis v. United States 29 and Francis v. Hen
derson,30 which he viewed as providing an alternative to the delib
erate by-pass standard of N oia.
In Davis, a federal prisoner's habeas corpus petition under the
relevant habeas statute sought for the first time to challenge the
makeup of the grand jury which indicted him. 31 Rule 12(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required that such a chal
lenge to the grand jury be made in a motion before trial. 32 The
rule further stated that failure to make objections to an issue would
constitute a waiver thereof, but the court, for cause shown, can
grant relief from the waiver. 33 The Davis Court held that this rule,
"promulgated by this Court and, . . . 'adopted' by Congress, gov
erns by its terms the manner in which the claims of defects in the
institution of criminal proceedings may be waived. . . ."34 The
Court in Davis stated that this standard, derived from the Federal
Rules rather than the Fay v. Noia concept of waiver, should apply
not only to direct review of the criminal proceedings, but also to
28. ld. at 87.
29. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
30. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
3l. 411 U.S. 233, 235 (1973). Federal prisoners are provided relief through 28
U.S.C. § 2255, which represents the counterpart to the remedy afforded state pris
oners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
32. The Federal Rule applicable at the time stated in pertinent part:
(b) The Motion Raising Defenses and Objections.
(2) Defenses and Objections Which Must Be Raised.
Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecu
tion or in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show juris
diction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised only by motion
before trial. The motion shall include all such defenses and objections then
available to the defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection
as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause
shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of
the indictment of information to charge an offense shall be noticed by the
court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). (Rule 12 was amended in 1975 and 12(b)(2) was recodified
in the new sections, 12(b) and 12(f). Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975)).
33. ld.
34. 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
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collateral proceedings involving federal habeas corpus petitions of
federal prisoners. 35 The Davis Court concluded that the claim
should be barred from habeas corpus as it would be from a hearing
on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance
and a showing of actual prejudice resulting from the procedural
default. 36 The Court ignored the Noia decision, stating that the
congressional purpose behind rule 12(b)(2), which governed waiver
during the criminal proceedings, would be perversely negated if
an entirely different and much more liberal requirement of waiver
in federal habeas corpus proceedings was to be used. 37
In 1976, in Francis v. Henderson,38 the rule of Davis was
applied in the case of a state prisoner attempting to challenge the
grand jury composition despite a state procedural requirement that
such challenges be raised before trial. The Court in Francis noted
that the federal courts had the power· to entertain such a habeas
corpus petition but that it would not do so, based on "considera~
tions of comity and concerns for orderly administration of criminal
justice. "39 The Francis Court ruled that the cause and prejudice
standard derived from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be applied to the state prisoner's federal habeas petition as
35. Id. at 242.
36. Id. The Davis Court derived the prejudice element from Shotwell Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963), which stated that where "objection to the jury
selection has not been timely raised under 12(b)(2), it is entirely proper to take ab
sence of prejudice into account in determining whether a sufficient showing has
been made to warrant relief from the effect of that Rule:' Davis v. United States, 411
U.S. 233, 244 (1973) (quoting Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 363).
The district court in the Davis case relied upon the element of prejudice and this
was accepted by the Supreme Court. 411 U.S. at 244.
37. Id. at 242. The Noia concept of waiver in federal habeas corpus was applied
to federal prisoners in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 222 (1969). See also
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). The Davis Court explained that in
Kaufman it had rejected a claim that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limited the availability of fed
eral habeas corpus relief when there was a waiver due to failure to assert a claim on
appeal. 411 U.S. at 240. The Court noted, however, that the claim of the government
in Davis was that because of a waiver rule 12(b)(2), and not § 2255, limited the avail
ability of federal habeas corpus proceedings. The government also argued that rule
12(b)(2) governed waiver of grand jury composition in the context of the criminal pro
ceedings themselves. The Court concluded that rule 12(b)(2) governed not only dur
ing the criminal proceedings, but also later at the habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 242.
As to the burden on federal courts using a more liberal standard of waiver for habeas
corpus review, see note 46 infra and accompanying text.
38. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
39. Id. at 539 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). This was the only men
tion of Noia in the majority opinion. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Francis, chal
lenged the Court to perform its "institutional duty" to overrule Fay v. Noia if that
was what it intended. 425 U.S. at 547.
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"[t]here is no reason to
give greater preclusive effect to pro
cedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by
state defendants. "40
In these two decisions, the Sykes Court discovered an alterna
tive analysis which it could use to limit the apparently all-inclusive
deliberate by-pass standard of Noia. In Davis, the Court ignored
Noia, relying instead on a questionable interpretation of congres
sional intent behind the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 41 In
Francis, the Court applied the cause and prejudice standard to
state prisoners to bar review of a challenge to the makeup of a
grand jury.42 The Sykes Court then extended the rule of Francis v.
Henderson to a waived objection to the admission of a confession at
trial. 43 The Sykes Court thus identified this type of procedural de
fault as an independent and adequate state ground that would bar
federal habeas corpus review as well as direct federal review.

III.

ANALYSIS

In analyzing Wainwright v. Sykes, it is important to note the
dramatic increase in federal habeas corpus petitions since Noia. 44
The effect of this increase may be overemphasized, however, as
many of the petitions do not require much time. 45 The volume of
applications can lead to the type of comment made by Justice
Jackson: "He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to
end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. "46

40.

[d. at 542 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969)).
41. See notes 48-54 infra and accompanying text.
42. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
43. 433 U.S. at 87. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
44. Petitions for habeas corpus filed by state prisoners jumped from 1,020 in
1961 to 7,949 in 1972. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260 n.14 (1973). See
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 11-5, 22, 28-32 (1972).
45. In 1968, over 6,300 petitions were filed in federal district courts by
state prisoners. This was an increase of 286 percent in just five years. Yet it
is all too easy to overstate the strain that an expanded habeas jurisdiction
and expanded federal constitutional rights put on the judicial system. Most
of the petitions were quickly dismissed: less than 500 reached the hearing
stage, and most of those hearings lasted less than one day. Nor was the bur
den on the states staggering; many petitions do not even require a response;
less than ten percent of the state convictions attacked had to be defended in
a hearing, and so few prisoners were released that the burden of retrial must
be small.
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1041
(1970) (footnotes omitted).
46. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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But as one commentator has noted, "it is not a needle we are
looking for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human
being. "47
In Davis, 48 the Court had already started its retreat from the
broad accessibility of federal courts through habeas corpus petitions
represented in the approach of Fay v. N oia. 49 The Court stated that
rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indicated
congressional intent to narrow such access. 50 Congressional intent,
however, is often difficult to ascertain accurately. Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Sykes, stated that:
[s]ince at least Brown v. Allen, it has been recognized that the
"fair effect [of] the habeas corpus jurisdiction as enacted by
Congress" entitles a state prisoner to such federal review. . . .
While some of my Brethren may feel uncomfortable with this
congressional choice of policy, ... the Legislative Branch none
theless remains entirely free to determine that the constitutional
rights of an individual subject to state custody, . . . are best
preserved by "interpos[ing] the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights .... "51

Justice Brennan also noted that alternative measures were available
to Congress when it made its policy choices regarding federal de
termination of constitutional rights in the habeas corpus area, 52
such as removing all state criminal cases to the federal courts
whenever constitutional defenses were raised. 53 He observed that
despite the availability of these· alternatives, "liberal post-trial fed
eral review is the redress that Congress ultimately chose to allow
and the consequences of a state procedural default should be
evaluated in conformance with this policy choice. "54 Notwithstand
ing Justice Brennan's comments, the Supreme Court, in decisions
47. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1,25
(1956). A 1966 study of this burden on federal courts concluded that: "While the
burden of state-prisoner habeas corpus petitions on the federal courts is increasing, it
has not yet reached alarming proportions, and presently represents only a small per
centage of the courts' total work load." 52 VA. L. REV. 486, 506 (1966). See also
Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321,
372 (1973).
48. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
50. 411 U.S. at 241.
51. 433 U.S. at 105-06 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970); note 4 supra and accompanying text.
53. 433 U.S. at 106-07.
54. Id.
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subsequent to Davis, continued to reduce the number of situations
in which state prisoners would have access to the federal habeas
corpus remedy.
In Stone v. Powell,55 the Court held that where a state has
provided a full and fair hearing of a fourth amendment claim, a
state prisoner would not be granted federal habeas corpus review.
The rationale given was that the deterrent purpose of the ex
clusionary rule would not be served by providing habeas corpus
relief to state prisoners and the harm to society would be great if
the exclusionary rule were to be applied. 56 Justice Brennan, dis
senting in Powell, feared that the decision contained the seeds for
the exclusion of a variety of constitutional rights-perhaps those
that were not thought to be "guilt related. "57
Unlike Stone v. Powell, which denied a federal hearing to a
state prisoner who had had a full hearing to challenge the state's
conduct at the state level, Wainwright v. Sykes denied a federal
hearing to a state prisoner who did not have a hearing at the state
level. Under Powell, federal habeas relief is only barred when the
state court has investigated the state government's conduct in a
full and fair hearing. In Sykes, there was no hearing on the challenge
to the state's conduct at any level, state or federal. Both decisions
curtail the proper role of the federal courts of "interpos[ing] the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians 6f
the people's federal rights..
"58
Over Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent, the Sykes Court has
55. 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976).
56. The Powell Court stated that exclusion at the trial level serves to discourage
police conduct that violates the fourth amendment. The Court noted, however, that
the additional deterrent effect of allowing the exclusionary rule to operate at federal
habeas corpus review when there was a prior hearing on the matter would be small
in relation to the consequences. [d. at 493. As to the consequences of applying the
exclusionary rule in habeas proceedings, the Court stated that it "deflects the
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty" and that "[t]he disparity in particular
cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a
guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality
that is essential to the concept of justice." [d. at 490 (footnotes omitted).
57. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Powell, stated that:
[T]he groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal ha
beas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention,
then at least for claims-for example, of double jeopardy, entrapment, self
incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification proce
dures-that this Court later decides are not "guilt related."
428 U.S. 465, 517-18 (footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan reiterated this view in
Sykes. 433 U.S. at 110.
58. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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closed the federal door on many state prisoners who have lost their
right to present federal claims at the state level due to procedural
defaults. Under the Noia standard of review the premise was that a
federal court would be required to entertain the habeas corpus pe
tition unless a ,deliberate by-pass of state procedures was found.
Under Sykes, however, there will be no hearing unless the defen
dant can satisfY the cause and prejudice standard. This shift in em
phasis will make the task of federal habeas petitioners more dif
ficult even though they have always had the burden of proof in
habeas corpus proceedings. 59 It can no longer be said, as it could
after Noia, that "the interest in achieving finality in criminal pro
ceedings is to be valued less highly than the interest in, assuring
that no individual is deprived of life or liberty in violation of the
Constitution. "60
The desire for finality at the trial level has traditionally been
compromised in the interest of achieving justice for the criminal
defendant. The entire system of liberal post-trial relief rests on the
assumption that at times the interest in finality in criminal proceed
ings must give way to the belated correction of error through direct
appeal and collateral review. 61 Collateral relief through habeas cor
pus to remedy inadvertent procedural defaults should not be se
verely restricted because of undue' deference to local procedure.
N oia recognized that:
[aJ man under conviction for. crime has an obvious inducement to
do his very best to keep his state remedies open, and not stake
his all on the outcome of a federal habeas prqceeding which, in
many respects, may be less advantageous to him than a state

59. Eagles v. United States ex rei. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304,314 (1946); Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938).
60. Pollak, The Supreme Court 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62, 140 (1963)
(footnote omitted).
61. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sykes, stated that:
The federal criminal system, to take one example, expressly disapproves of
interlocutory review in the generality of .cases even though such a policy
would foster finality by permitting the a'uthoritative resolution of all legal
and constitutional issues prior to the convening of the "main event." . . .
Instead, it relies on ,th'e belated correction of error, through appeal and col
lateral review, to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal sanction.
Indeed, the very existence of the well-established right collaterally to
reopen issues previously litigated before the state courts, ... represents a
congressional policy choice that is inconsistent with notions of strict
finality-and probably more so than authorizing the litigation of issues that,
due to inadvertence, were never addressed to any court.
433 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted).
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court proceeding.
. And if because of inadvertence or neglect
he runs afoul of a state procedural requirement, and thereby for
feits his state remedies, appellate and collateral, as well as direct
review thereof in this Court, those consequences should be suffi
cient to vindicate the State's valid interest in orderly proce
dure. 62
The Court in Sykes emphasized the importance of maintaining
the integrity of the state's procedural rules. The Court indicated its
desire to have all parties view the criminal trial as the "main
event," not a meaningless ritual which precedes the real adjudica
tion of a defendant's claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 63
Justice Rehnquist noted that, "[s]ociety's resources have been con
centrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the
limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innoceQce of one
of its citizens. "64 The value of a state contemporaneous objection
rule is that it forces a decision on an issue at the trial if an objec
tion is raised. It also enables a better and more accurate record to
be made because recollections are fresh and the trial judge is able
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Justice Rehnquist, for
the majority, stated that the Noia rule could be used to ignore
state procedures:
We think that the rule of Fay v. Noia, broadly stated, may
encourage "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers, who
may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial
court and intend to raise their constitutional claims in federal
habeas corpus court if their initial gamble does not payoff. 65
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, answered this charge by outlining
what would be involved in a "sandbagging" effort by defense coun
sel under the Noia rule. First, the possibility of conviction would
increase as evidence which might have been excluded is allowed in
by the deliberate failure of the attorney to object. Second, as a
result of the waiver, all direct review in the state court would be
lost. Third, defense counsel would then have to deceive a federal
habeas court and convince the federal judge that he did not delib
erately by-pass the state procedures. Justice Brennan concluded
that the belief that many lawyers were induced into the "sandbag
ging" defense simply offended common sense. 66 The fear of
62. 372 U.S. 391, 433 (1963) (citation omitted).
63. 433 U.S. at 90.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id. at 103-04 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"sandbagging," moreover, does not square with the Noia opinion.
It was just this type of deliberate by-pass that Noia sought to
prevent.
Justice Rehnquist failed to recognize that there are other
reasons, besides the unlikely "sandbagging" maneuver, why all the
issues of a criminal trial may not be resolved at the "main event."
One such situation occurs when an attorney inadvertently fails to
object in order to preserve claims for appeal. A similar problem is
raised when the state court uses an erroneous interpretation of
constitutional law as the basis for its decision. When an attorney
objects for appeal purposes, he saves the client's federal claims for
direct review in both the state and federal systems. When an at
torney inadvertently fails to object, the defendant forteits his right
to direct review, leaving habeas corpus review as the last forum
available. Therefore, courts should be careful to distinguish an at
tomey's inadvertent failure to object from the situation in which
the attorney chooses to forego raising a claim for tactical reasons.
To deny habeas corpus relief because of an inadvertent procedural
default would ignore the "primary responsibility" of the federal
courts to "[preserve] federal rights and privileges, "67 and work
undue hardship on the criminal defendant. The Sykes Court failed
to make this distinction and chose simply to conclude that Sykes
had failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard.
It remains to be seen if the cause and prejudice standard of
Sykes will maintain the Writ's great tradition as "the best and only
sufficient defence of personal freedom"68 and "both the symbol and
guardian of individual liberty. "69 The standard was intentionally left
undefined by the Court. Because it is meant to be narrower than
the N oia standard,70 the number of habeas corpus petitions enter
tained by federal courts will decrease. The Court intended the
Sykes standard to provide the leeway necessary to obtain review
when a procedural default has occurred. Whether it will or not is
an open question. The cause and prejudice standard was not clearly
defined in the earlier decisions of Davis v. United States or Francis
v. Henderson.71 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sykes, noted wryly
that, "although some four years have passed since its introduction
in Davis v. United States, . . . the only thing clear about the
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

Id. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 29-40 supra and accompanying text.
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Court's 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard is that it exhibits the nota
ble tendency of keeping prisoners in jail without addressing their
constitutional complaints. "72
In failing to distinguish between a deliberate by-pass of state
procedure and an inadvertent default, the Sykes Court has neces
sarily rejected traditional notions of personal informed waiver by a
criminal defendant in the trial context. The Noia Court defined the
deliberate by-pass formula through the traditional waiver test of
Johnson v. Zerbst which required an "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."73 By rejecting the de
liberate by-pass standard, the Sykes Court has also rejected this
personal waiver test. In its place, the Court has suggested a system
of procedural forfeitures, based not upon the client's informed de
cisions but rather upon the attorney's procedural choices or mis
takes. 74
72. 433 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Lo~d v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977); Nichols v. Estelle, 556
F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977). The
personal infonned waiver test of Zerbst did not preclude attorneys from waiving the
accused's rights. Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirement of Personal Partici
pation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262 (1966).
The rationales for this result, however, do not support the conclusion that inadvertent
attorney action should be permitted to waive the client's rights.
One traditional rationale for allowing the attorney to waive his or her client's
rights rested upon notions of agency law. Id. at 1278-81. In Sykes, however, Justice
Brennan observed that this rationale is inapposite in criminal proceedings:
With respect to ordinary commercial matters, the common law established
and recognized principal-agent relationships for the protection of innocent
third parties who deal with the latter. In the context of a criminal trial, this
analogy is not apt, for the State, primarily in control of the criminal process
and responsible for qualifying and assigning attorneys to represent the ac
cused, is not a wholly innocent bystander. Consequently, the dominant rela
tionship of the trial counsel with respect to his client more recently has
been 'found simply to inhere in "our legal system" or "our adversary sys
tem."

433 U.S. at 114 n.13 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A second view justified attorney waiver as part of trial strategy and tactics de
vised by the attorney, who was regarded as the manager of the defendant's case. See,
e.g., Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73, 78 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).
However, inadvertent attorney waiver by hypothesis cannot be considered a tactical
maneuver or part of trial strategy.
The Supreme Court has on occasion limited the circumstances in which an at
torney may waive his or her client's rights. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 451-52 (1965) (counsel may waive accused's rights at trial unless there are ex
ceptional circumstances). When fundamental rights are involved, a personal waiver
by the client is required. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (fifth
amendment rights); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (right to a jury
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This suggested system of procedural forfeitures is contrary to
the view that "courts indulge [in] every reasonable presumption
against waiver"75 of fundamental rights and that the courts "do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. "76 While
the concept of waiver is based on informed consent, the Sykes sys
tem of forfeiture of rights fails to distinguish informed consent from
the unknowing failure to assert rights at the appropriate time. Be
cause the rights involved in the criminal process directly affect the
defendant's life and liberty, this system should not be allowed to
replace a system based on informed waiver of rights.
If a system of waiver is to be retained, the Sykes focus on the
attorney's actions rather than on the client's actions creates the
need for a standard against which the nature of the attorney's
waiver of his client's rights can be judged. The standard for deter
mining whether a valid attorney waiver has occurred should be the
same as that used in the past to judge the client's own actions: the
Zerbst standard of intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.
A standard requiring that attorney waiver of client rights be
informed may be too burdensome in the context of direct review in
state and federal courts since, "the trial of a criminal defendant
[should] not inevitably be followed by a trial of his attorney's per
formance."77 Concern for the value of state procedures would re
quire a less stringent standard for attorney waiver of claims in the
context of direct appellate remedies. This would allow state con
temporaneous objection rules to operate to cause a forfeiture of
state remedies, appellate and collateral, as well as direct review in
the Supreme Court. Such a forfeiture should foster adherence to
state procedural requirements. 78 However, a stringent informed
waiver standard is appropriate in examining the attorney's actions
in the context of a habeas proceeding because that forum is the
defendant's last resort for any hearing. Access to the federal habeas
trial). These cases illustrate situations in which the client must participate in the
waiver decision. They do not support the conclusion that inadvertent attorney action
should be viewed as an effective waiver of the client's rights.
75. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (jury trial) (foot
note omitted); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (jury trial). See also John
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (right to counsel).
76. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (waiver of counsel is not to be
presumed from a silent record).
77. 433 U.S. at 114 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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corpus' forum should not be cut off because of the attorney's inad
vertence in causing the procedural default. This informed waiver
standard should not unduly burden the federal habeas corpus
system. 79
It is unclear from the Sykes decision whether the cause and
prejudice standard will be satisfied by a showing of inadvertent at
torney waiver. If the proper measure used to judge a valid attorney
waiver of client rights for habeas corpus purposes is the Zerbst in
formed waiver standard, then only such a waiver by the attorney
will serve to deny federal habeas corpus review to the client. Thus,
a showing of inadvertent waiver by the attorney should be suffi
cient to satisfY Sykes' two requirements of showing cause for the
disregarding of state procedural rules and prejudice resulting from
the default.
The Sykes Court did not consider whether the attorney waiver
in that case was inadvertent, finding simply that the cause and
prejudice standard was not met. 80 It left to later decisions the task
of defining that standard and its application to an inadvertent attor
ney waiver. Therefore, in subsequent cases, the Court can reject
the suggested system of forfeitures and return to a system of in
formed waiver focusing not on the client's informed waiver, but
rather on the attorney's knowing relinquishment of his client's
rights to allow access to federal habeas corpus for inadvertent de
faults.
Justice Brennan strongly objected to the decision in Sykes be
cause he assumed that the facts indicated an inadvertent waiver by
the attorney. He attempted to retain the Zerbst standard as applied
to the defendant's own actions, stating that the defendant should
79. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
80. 433 U.S. at 91. Justice Brennan believed that it was because of simple error
that Sykes' attorney failed to object to the admission of the confession. Id. at 105.
Although the majority opinion did not reach this issue, see note 26 supra, it left the
door open for a different rule in situations in which a defendant was faced with a
"grisly choice" as in Naia:
We have no occasion today to consider the Fay rule as applied to the facts
there confronting the Court. Whether the Francis rule should preclude fed
eral habeas review of claims not made in accordance with state procedure
where the criminal defendant has surrendered, other than for reasons of tac
tical advantage, the right to have all of his claims of trial error considered by
a state appellate court, we leave for another day.
433 U.S. at 88 n.12. In Naia, the defendant waived his right to appeal for fear of the
possibility of the death sentence in a subsequent retrial. See note 16 supra. Since an
inadvertent waiver, although not a waiver in the face of a "grisly choice," is nonethe
less a waiver made other than for reasons of tactical advantage, a different rule could
apply in that situation as well.
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knowingly and intelligently participate with his lawyer where possi
ble in the trial. 81 The requirement of personal participation by the
accused where possible would be difficult to define. Justice Burger,
concurring in Sykes, objected to this requirement reasoning that
the Zerbst standard, which had been thought to govern the ac
cused's waiver, was inappropriate as a standard for attorney waiver.
Justice Burger concluded that this vague standard would be un
manageable. 82
The standard proposed by Justice Brennan would indeed be
difficult to administer. It would require an inquiry into whether it
was possible for the accused to consult with the attorney regarding
each attorney waiver. A more workable approach would be to use
the Zerbst standard as applied directly to attorneys to determine
the quality of their waiver of client rights at the trial. The Zerbst
standard would serve as a standard for attorney waiver of client
rights as well as a standard for personal waiver by the client where
personal waiver by the client is required. 83 Whether the attorney
had an opportunity to consult with the accused in trial strategy
would not be the issue. Rather, the Court would ask whether the
attorney made a knowing waiver of his client's rights. The applica
tion of the Zerbst standard in this way takes into account the diffi
culty of consulting with the accused about every possible tactical
maneuver in the trial. It accepts the reality that the "vast array of
trial decisions, strategic, and tactica1"84 are for the attorney to
make. The stress is not on personal participation by the accused
but on the attorney's knowing waiver. In this way, the Zerbst stan
dard, as applied directly to attorneys regardless of their consulta
tion with the accused, becomes a workable definition for valid at
torney waiver of client rights for purposes of federal habeas corpus
review in the face of a procedural waiver at the state trial. 85
81. 433 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 94.
83. See note 74 supra.
84. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
85. Because the attorney can waive many of the accused's rights, a question
must be raised as to how much knowledge is required of the attorney in order to
make an effective waiver. Counsel need not know for certain that a valid objection to
a substantive right exists. He must know simply that there is an arguable basis for
such an objection. If he then decides not to object, it has been held that this consti
tutes a valid waiver. Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20, 25-26 (9th Cir. 1966) (waiver
found when an attorney who was not certain he had a valid ground to object to a
certain fourth amendment claim decided not to object). See also Estelle v. Wil
liams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). There, the attorney's failure to object when the defendant
was dressed in prison garb at his trial was held to be a waiver. Id. at 512-13. The
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It is especially important that an inadvertent attorney waiver
not preclude habeas relief when illegal government conduct has
procured the conviction. A conviction procured by unconstitutional
means remains unconstitutional,86 and a rule forfeiting the defen
dant's remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct
that helped procure the conviction. 87 It must be remembered that
the state, which initiates the prosecution, initially decides how the
case is to be presented. It should not be allowed to benefit from
illegal conduct and hope that procedural error on the part of de
fense counsel will foreclose the chances of righting the wrong. 88
As it is unclear whether a showing of inadvertent attorney
waiver will satisfy the cause and prejudice standard of Sykes, an
alternative method of gaining access to federal habeas corpus courts
is desirable. That method might be found in a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel resting in part on counsel's inadvertent waiver
of client rights. The Supreme Court has denounced the "denial of
effective and substantia1"89 assistance of counsel and the appoint
ment of counsel in a manner which precludes "the giving of effec
tive aid. "90 The attorney in an inadvertent waiver situation should
argue for a standard that defines the denial of effective representa
tion as the failure to give representation that is "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. "91 Such a
standard would make ineffective assistance of counsel a viable
claim. 92

attorney did not object, believing that such an objection would have been futile. The
applicable law, however, would have supported such an objection if it had been
made. Id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring). In both these cases, counsel was aware that
an objection might have been made. They were not inadvertent waivers but waivers
due to a conscious choice which later proved to be an error in judgment.
86. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963). See also Grano, The Right to Coun
sel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1229 (1970).
87. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963).
88. United States ex rei. Vanderhorst v. LaVallee, 285 F. Supp. 233,244 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968).
89. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
90. Id. at 71.
91. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (standard used to evaluate
attorney advice to defendant to assure that defendant's plea of guilty was voluntary).
See also Toilette v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,266 (1973).
92. The "mockery of justice" standard has been used in some cases dealing
with ineffec~ive assistance of counsel. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir.
1965). This standard, however, did not adequately protect the right of the accused to
effective assistance of counsel. Relief was granted only, "when the trial was a farce,
or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or
the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense,
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The overriding conflict that is apparent in the line of cases
leading to Sykes occurs between the desire for finality and the
need for justice in state criminal proceedings. In this balancing ef
fort, Noia was decided in favor of the need for justice. Noia sought
to remove "all procedural hurdles to the achievement of swift and
imperative justice on habeas corpus . . . . "93 It emphasized that all
I

or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation." Id. (citations omit
ted). For cases denying relief under the mockery test, see: United States v. Currier,
405 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1969); Hayes v. Russell, 405 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1969);
Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Stahl, 393 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.),' cert. denied, 393 U.S. 879 (1968); Kienlen v. United
States, 379 F.2d 20 (lOth Cir. 1967); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967); United States ex rei. Darcy v. Handy, 203
F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945).
Modern tests for effective assistance of counsel require a certain level of compe
tence from attorneys. These tests can be used as a basis for relief when the mockery
of justice test would provide no relief. In United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey,
510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), the state-appointed lawyer did not seek to postpone the
start of the trial in order to investigate the role of a codefendant in the alleged crime.
This failure to adequately prepare the case was held to be grossly incompetent pro
fessional conduct. Id. at 640-41. The court broadened the mockery test in order to
grant relief, requiring "legal assistance which meets a minimum standard of profes
sional representation." Id. at 641. See also United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197,
1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assis
tance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious advocate") (footnote
omitted) (emphasis in original). ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, states
that "[tlhe basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice
is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate, with courage, devotion and to
the utmost of his learning and ability and according to law." Id. § 1.1(b) (1971).
Though these standards are not intended "as criteria for the judicial evaluation of the
effectiveness of counsel to determine the validity of a conviction; they mayor may
not be relevant in such judicial evaluation . . . depending upon all the circum
stances." Id. § 1.1 (f).
In Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977), a case decided after the
Sykes decision and involving a procedural default, counsel for the defendant ob
jected to the introduction of evidence of prior uncounselled convictions which were
used for purposes of the Texas Sentence Enhancement Statute. Id. at 507. His objec
tions, however, were not based on grounds that were supportable despite the exis
tence of such grounds. Id. at 510. Counsel consequently violated the state contem
poraneous objection rule which required an objection based on the very ground on
which later relief is sought. Id. at 507. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the lower district court's refusal to entertain the habeas petition and remanded the
case to determine if counsel's incompetence satisfied the Sykes requirement of show
ing cause for the procedural default. Id. at 511. While this is not a case of inadvertent
attorney waiver, as counsel was aware of the proper time to object, the court's
analysis could be used to allow relief for a defendant who has lost rights because of
the inadvertence of counsel which amounted to professional incompetence.
93. 372 U.S. 391,435 (1963).
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habeas petitions would be entertained despite the procedural de
fault unless the default was a deliberate by-pass of the state proce
dures. The Sykes Court was content to let procedural hurdles block
a state prisoner's access to the federal habeas corpus forum. The
Sykes view is that no petitions will be heard because of the exis
tence of the procedural default unless a petitioner can show cause
for the default and prejudice resulting from it.
Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Sykes that the defen
dant had two interests to assert. One was to preserve his access to
the federal courts despite the state procedural default. The other
interest was to have some court hear his constitutional claims. 94
The Sykes decision subordinates both of these interests to the goal
of achieving finality in the local procedure. It not only accepts the
denial of access to a state forum because of a violation of the state
procedural rules, but also denies access to the federal habeas forum
in many cases.
In applying the cause and prejudice standard of Sykes, courts
should attempt to accommodate the state prisoner who has lost
rights through inadvertent attorney error. It is senseless and mis
directed to deny habeas relief to such a defendant. It is
senseless because unplanned and unintentional action of any
kind is not subject to deterrence. . . . And it is a misdirected
sanction because even if the penalization of incompetence or
carelessness will encourage more thorough legal training and
trial preparation, the habeas applicant, as opposed t~ his lawyer,
hardly is the proper recipient of such a penalty. 95

If the Sykes standard cannot provide relief for such a prisoner, then
Justice Brennan's warning may become reality:
If the standard adopted today is later construed to require that
the simple mistakes of attorneys are to be treated as binding
forfeitures, it would serve to subordinate the fundamental rights
contained in our constitutional charter to inadvertent defaults of
rules promulgated by state agencies and would essentially leave
it to the States, through the enactment of procedure and the
certification of the competence of local attorneys, to determine
whether a habeas applicant will be permitted the access to the
federal forum that is guaranteed him by Congress. 96

John P. Letourneau

433 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. ld. at 113.
96. ld. at 107 (footnote omitted).

94.

